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JURISPRUDENCE "UNDER-MIND"?: THE CASE OF
THE ATHEISTIC SOLIPSIST
IRA P. ROBBINS*
N early thirty years have passed since the publication of Professor
Lon L. Fuller's The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,1 in
which a fictional court expounded upon the manifold ways in which
certain harsh necessities, externally imposed upon common people,
can test the rules of the criminal law. The instant case is not in-
tended to parody the Speluncean Explorers, but rather to comple-
ment it with the inverse theme: the singular defendant is a psycho-
logically extraordinary individual existing in a relatively mundane
environment. The Atheistic Solipsist provides the opportunity for
consideration of the ways internal forces of great intensity can shape
the manners in which people behave and the way the legal
enterprise functions.
Often it is useful to return to underlying precepts in order to
refine and comprehend more fully the contemporary state of
knowledge. Like Fuller's case, this one is
constructed for the sole purpose of bringing into a common focus
divergent philosophies of law and government. These philosophies
presented men with live questions of choice in the days of Plato
and Aristotle. Perhaps they will continue to do so when our era
has had its say about them. If there is any element of prediction
in the case, it does not go beyond a suggestion that the questions
involved are among the permanent problems of the human race.2
The ensuing dialogue is dedicated to the life and work of Professor
Fuller.
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OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES
HENKER, C. J.
The defendant, Einzig, appeals from a conviction of murder
in the first degree with a sentence of life imprisonment. The case
was tried without a jury, at the election of the defendant. There
was little or no disagreement regarding the facts at trial; thus, this
appeal concerns only conclusions of law as determined and applied
by the trial court.
The homicide for which Einzig was convicted is one of the
more bizarre crimes to come before this Court for review. Random,
the victim, was a wealthy man, and a collector of works of art.
Although they were not well acquainted with one another, Einzig
twice had purchased paintings from Random, and was negotiating
to purchase a third before the crime occurred. Einzig had been
invited on a weekend camping expedition by Random to discuss
the proposed transaction. A fishing guide, Sam Arrowton, accom-
panied the defendant and the decedent, and was the only eye-
witness to the killing.
Arrowton related at trial that, shortly prior to his death,
Random had attempted to kindle a campfire using an aerosol-type
can of liquid fuel. The can burst open, apparently completely by
accident, and Random was badly burned on his face and hands.
The burns were so severe that he lost consciousness, but the
coroner's report negated any possibility that they could have been
fatal or contributed to Random's death.
Arrowton administered first aid, but quickly concluded that
expert medical attention was required. He told Einzig to remain
with the victim until help could be brought from town. Einzig,
however, refused to be left behind, saying that his only purpose in
coming on the trip had been to discuss business, and that he
would like to return to town as soon as possible. A vehement dis-
cussion followed. Arrowton was unwilling to leave the unconscious
Random unattended, but doubted that they could assemble an ade-
quate litter to permit transportation of Random. The defendant
was unfamiliar with the terrain, which was hilly and overgrown.
As a result, it was unlikely that he could reach town in any reason-
able time should he attempt to go for assistance while Arrowton
stayed behind. Arrowton demanded that the defendant remain,
arguing that any other course of action would jeopardize Random's
life.
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At that juncture, defendant Einzig, who had remained calm
(and later denied any anger or emotional distress), took a hand gun
from Random's camping gear and shot the unconscious victim once
through the head, killing him instantly. Einzig replaced the gun,
then turned to Arrowton and asked whether there was any reason
at that time why they could not both return to town. After taking
the weapon, Arrowton replied that they had best return as quickly
as possible. Shortly after reaching town, Einzig was taken into
custody by local authorities and charged with Random's murder.
The defendant denied none of these facts at trial. His defense
instead relied primarily upon his philosophical or religious beliefs
in a number of arguments, some quite novel. Essentially, Einzig
possesses an abiding belief in a doctrine known as "solipsism," the
basic tenet of which is that the presence of more than one mind in
the universe cannot be demonstrated. In other words, the defendant
professes (if the word may be so abused) to be the sole thinking
creature in existence. Such a belief is not sui generis to Einzig, but
-as was sufficiently demonstrated by expert witnesses below-has
been advanced historically as an extension of the philosophy of
skepticism. As a result, Einzig apparently believes that human
beings are, for all intents and purposes, distinguishable from
animals or trees only in shape and color, and that certainly there
is no Supreme Being. Thus, in a sense, solipsism is akin to Hindu-
ism turned upside-down, according to counsel for the Government,
in that the Hindu reveres all life, whereas the solipsist equally
demeans all life but his own. Defense counsel prefers to character-
ize his client's attitude as one of benign indifference. The truth-
which, after all, is what our criminal justice system aspires to
achieve-may well lie somewhere amid these positions.
The defense has argued along more or less conventional lines
that Einzig lacked the requisite state of mind for a conviction of the
crime of murder in the first degree. In this jurisdiction, as in many
others, both malice and intent are elements of any murder, with a
further requirement of premeditation in the case of a first degree
murder. Notably, the defense does not contend that Einzig failed
to premeditate his act, but rather argues that his intent could not
have been to kill, since concepts of life and death have no meaning
for him except as applied to himself, and, further, that his act was
without malice, either actual or implied.
The trial court found that the defendant did not mistake the
decedent for anything but a man, that he intended to shoot the
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decedent, and that any misapprehension as to the result of a severe
gunshot wound was irrelevant to the issue of criminal intent. In
the words of the respected trial judge,
[p]recise grasp of all of the natural effects caused by a gunshot,
whether those effects be physical or metaphysical, is not required.
The defendant had no reason to think that Mr. Random was al-
ready dead. His indifference to the distinction between life and
death in anyone but himself does not prevent him from recogniz-
ing that distinction. Thus there is no barrier, merely because the
defendant considered Mr. Random's life to be too "hypothetical"
to be significant, to a finding that the defendant intended to kill
him. (Emphasis in original.)
Simple reflection on the facts should suffice to prove the wisdom of
these words. Although the sole discernible purpose of the de-
fendant's acts was to induce Arrowton to forsake Random and
return to town, the method chosen by the defendant was to free
Arrowton from any need to stay. That the defendant decided to
turn the gun on Random rather than on Arrowton evidences an
appreciation of the causal link between the health of his victim
and the freedom to return to town. The defendant's act would have
been completely irrational, in its context, unless he had perceived
that Arrowton would leave only if he were no longer needed. This
could be achieved only by either healing Random or killing him.
The admission of Einzig that his intent was to reach town, coupled
with the ludicrousness of any claim that he could have intended to
cure Random and the indubitable purposefulness of his act, compel
the judgment that he wished Random dead.
These same considerations are persuasive on the question of
malice. The only purpose that can be imputed to the defendant
logically entailed an end to Random's life. The defendant's im-
precise formulation of this objective cannot obscure the fact that
his acts speak for themselves, and manifest an intent to kill a
human being.
The defense also raises a unique claim that the guarantee of
free exercise of religion under the Constitution prohibits this
conviction. This contention is thoroughly devoid of merit. Even if
"religions of one" were guaranteed protection-a questionable
proposition in itself-murder is in no way a ritual of the solipsistic
faith. Homicide is not a form of worship, and would not be pro-
tected if it were. Furthermore, it is definitive merely to note
that the trial court determined that Einzig does not have a sincere
belief in any God.
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Finally, I concur with my brother Marshal on the issue of the
defendant's sanity, and with my brother Barrister on the defendant's
competence to stand trial.
I conclude that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
BARRISTER, J.
With all due respect to Chief Justice Henker, I feel that I must
disagree entirely with his analysis of the law of criminal intent as it
is applied in this case. Although it may well be that some subtlety
in the Chief Justice's analysis is eluding me, I can in good conscience
come to no other determination than that his conclusions are based
upon fallacious reasoning. As I understand his opinion, the Chief
Justice contends that because the defendant shot the victim rather
than the witness Arrowton, it is permissible to ascribe to him a
specific intent to cause the death of a human being. This argument
does have a certain degree of superficial appeal, for, as the Chief
Justice indicates, it is the only way to view the defendant's act as
being both purposeful and rational. However, the law does not
conclusively presume nor does it even contemplate that an act is
purposeful or rational. The evidence creates strong doubts, to say
the least, about the defendant's rationality. Moreover, and more
importantly, such an argument constitutes an unwarranted exten-
sion of the law of imputed intent in this jurisdiction.
It has been stipulated by both parties that the actual thoughts
of the defendant at the time of the killing did not concern the death
of a human being, due to his inability to conceive of such an
occurrence in a meaningful way. Therefore, it cannot successfully
be argued as a permissible inference from the evidence that the
defendant intended to cause the death of a human being. Specific
intent may thus be imputed, if at all, only by rule of law. And,
of course, our long-settled rule is that specific intent or malice may
be constructively implied only in cases of reckless acts-those acts
done without regard for the consequences and that create a high
probability of serious injury to other persons.
Specific intent, either imputed or actual, is a crucial element
of the crime in question. This requirement is not an empty for-
mality, but is supported by strong considerations of public policy.
Both recklessness and actual intent are functional measures of the
degree to which the accused is prone to repeat his criminal be-
havior on future occasions. In the same way that acting on a desire
1979]
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to see a fellow human die portends repeated acts of aggression,
having a reckless attitude is a harbinger of injuries to come. Lesser
penalties for homicides in which neither of these states of mind is
present indicates a legislative policy to treat more leniently those
whose tendency toward causing harm is more uncertain.
I do not think that this defendant has any greater tendency to
endanger others than does one who kills after reasonable provoca-
tion or while too intoxicated to appreciate his deed. The defendant
ought not be convicted of first degree murder for that reason. Even
were this conclusion challenged, I would still vote to overturn the
conviction simply because the statute must be interpreted in the
defendant's favor, and construed narrowly, whenever fairly debat-
able distinctions can be drawn. The defendant did not act recklessly.
Therefore, he had neither actual nor imputed intent to cause the
death of a human being, and should not have been convicted as
charged.
My brothers Henker and Marshal state that the defendant was
and is fully competent to stand trial. I agree. There is no impair-
ment of his ability to appreciate the seriousness of the charges
against him, and to respond intelligently and deliberately to the
advice of counsel. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that
a solipsist cannot assist adequately in his defense, even though he
may be unable to defend another.
The defendant's sanity, however, is a separate question. His
admitted inability to consider with sympathy the death, as we know
it, of another human being, seems to be solid evidence of a severe
psychosis, as several witnesses suggested at trial. Our well-
established rule is that
[t]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was do-
ing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing
what was wrong. Commonwealth v. Oughten.
There may be some merit to the proposition that the defendant's
inability to perceive that other people have minds prevents him
from understanding the distinction between right and wrong gen-
erally. But avoiding the thorny problems this portion of the rule
has engendered, it is my opinion that the defendant is insane under
the first Oughten criterion. Solipsism, as outlined in the briefs, is
such a radical belief that the defendant cannot differentiate bene-
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ficial acts from deleterious ones. The victim was, to the defendant's
mind, no more than a piece of machinery. Einzig was, therefote,
incapable of understanding the harmfulness of the act of shooting
the decedent, irrespective of what other understanding of his act
he possessed. Notwithstanding the conclusions of the Chief Justice
as to what must have been in the defendant's mind, it must be
accepted that the defendant could not understand the pernicious-
ness of his deed. Such a misapprehension, or nonapprehension, of
the quality of his act places the defendant in the realm of insanity
under either of the Oughten criteria, and, certainly, either alone is
sufficient to support my vote on the result in this case.
I believe that a more enlightened insanity rule should be
adopted-one that would more explicitly cover instances such as
this, in which a defendant is no longer capable of acting upon
his everyday knowledge of matters of fact. However, because
neither the members of the legislature nor my colleagues have
determined to support a new rule, I decline to base my vote on
what ought to be the law, and rely instead upon Oughten. Thus,
on the ground of insanity, I would vacate the judgment.
MARSHAL, J.
The atypical factual situation before the Court has presented
a not unwelcome respite from the insipidity of our routine. Cases
such as those involving breach of contract, failure to allege affirma-
tive defenses, and the compartmentalizing of licensees, invitees, and
trespassers have a soporific effect absent some imaginative deliver-
ance from the groundswell of ennui. -Novelty, however, should not
be confused with complexity, nor should it be mistaken for merit.
If only those who practice before us would be mindful that this is
a court of review, rather than one of original jurisdiction, the
intoxication induced by the excitement of this case could be dis-
pelled, and a wise and just decision reached.
The lower court judge, sitting as trier of both fact and law,
has found the defendant competent to stand trial, sane, and guilty
of premeditated murder. This Court has the limited function of
determining whether these findings are prejudically erroneous.
Findings of fact may be found objectionable only if a reasonable
person could not infer them beyond a reasonable doubt upon the
evidence presented. Rulings of law are to be overturned only when
they are contrary either to settled precedent or an urgent require-
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ment to reinterpret the law. Under these standards, I would up-
hold the judgment.
The evidence of Einzig's competence to stand trial has been
amply discussed by Justice Barrister, and will not be repeated here.
Since the issue was not even raised by defense counsel at the trial
level, I fail to see why it should be a present concern.
Strong objection has been made to the finding that Einzig was
sane at the time of the commission of the crime. The eloquence of
the presentation on behalf of Einzig is impressive; yet, despite its
power to inveigle one of our number, it is nevertheless inadequate.
Concededly, Einzig's psychology is uncommon, and his perception
of commonplace behavior may well be drastically different from
that of most men. But a finding that he is abnormal does not neces-
sitate the conclusion that he is mentally deficient. His condition
stems not from a mental defect, but rather from an excessive zeal or
preoccupation of a character that arguably is purely intellectual.
Indeed, my brother Blitz is persuaded that Einzig's psychological
aberration is a sign of intellectual superiority, and not of deficiency.
The law requires not only that the defendant be incapacitated, but
also that the incapacity be the result of mental defect. Thus, a find-
ing of insanity is not compelled. Alternatively, it would hardly
seem that a reinterpretation of the law of insanity is exigent, for it
is improbable that Einzig would derive greater benefit in an asylum
than in a prison, or that society would be better served by such a
result. Although neither option would appear to be an altogether
efficient solution to the problem presented by Einzig's condition,
his status alone does not warrant a reconsideration of our rule.
Similarly, there exist no sufficient grounds for holding that this
case falls squarely within any of the exceptions already enunciated
by this Court on the issues of intent or malice. If Einzig is not to
be convicted, the exceptions to the general rule must be extended.
But the trial judge decided not to so extend them, and there
is no good reason for us now to do otherwise. Certainly there is no
public sympathy for Einzig's plight. His deed can occasion nothing
but revulsion in a person of common sensibility. To extend a privi-
lege to one who has dispassionately killed, where others would have
been moved to the extreme of solicitude, would indeed be an
anomalous judicial act. So long as the imperatives of legality can be
fulfilled, public order demands that Einzig be removed from society
physically-whether or not such a freethinking believer in meta-
physics personally conceives of such a concept-in order to avoid
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any risk of recurrence of dangerously thoughtless violence on his
part. The law should not be redefined to frustrate the achievement
of these goals.
Refusal to uphold this conviction could serve only to intro-
duce new playthings for defense counsel. Solipsism is not a difficult
attitude to feign, since it closely resembles the egocentric tempera-
ment and histrionics common to many an unctuous offender. The
administrative burden necessary to sort out a bona fide complaint
from the myriad of frivolous assertions that irrefutably would
follow a reversal of this conviction would be an unjustifiable waste
of valuable resources. Wisdom therefore dictates that Einzig's
claims be rejected.
BLITZ, J.
Never before in my career on both sides of the bench have I
witnessed such a concerted attempt to overlook the merits of an
attorney's argument. My brother Henker has virtually spat on the
defendant's brief, and none of my noble colleagues has seen fit to
take notice of the soiled contents. Brother Barrister has done the
defendant the signal honor of inviting him to reside with those
among us who offer the best evidence for the possible truth of
solipsism-the inmates of the Hospital for the Mentally Insane. In
a perverse way, this has some justice to it-something along the
lines of the man without a country, or, to be more precise for
present purposes, a man without a society. Justice Marshal avoids
all of the technical niceties, and simply seeks an innocuous rationale
to support his preconceived verdict that the defendant is a "danger-
ous person." As for Justice Forthwright, perhaps all one can say is
that her attitude towards the law makes solipsism attractive indeed.
If my colleagues had paid attention to counsel at oral argument
rather than to their own predilections, they might have recognized
that grave constitutional objections have been levelled at a large
part of our criminal justice system. I find these objections suffici-
ently weighty to necessitate reversal of the defendant's conviction.
The defense contends that Mr. Einzig has been convicted and
is to be punished primarily for his religious beliefs. Whether homi-
cide is some kind of religious ritual vel non is not the issue. What
is the issue is whether Mr. Einzig is to be punished simply because
his beliefs differ from our own. The Chief Justice would permit
elevating this crime from simple manslaughter to first degree
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murder solely because the defendant is a solipsist. Justice Barrister,
for the same reason, would confine Mr. Einzig in an institution.
Perhaps no clearer case could be made of a sanction against an un-
popular belief. If the defendant had had no reverence for a partic-
ular life, that of his victim, and expressed his viewpoint by means
of a thoughtlessly lethal act, he would plainly be guilty of no more
than second degree murder. But because of his general cynicism,
the Court would apply the excessive sanction of either life im-
prisonment or indefinite institutional confinement.
As Mr. Justice Barrister so innocently notes, Mr. Einzig is no
more deadly than a mean drunk or an incensed but rational assail-
ant. Why, then, should he be punished more severely than either
of those killers? The former is incapacitated, the latter guilty only
of involuntary manslaughter. The difference, I submit, is that we
disapprove less of alcohol and rage than we do of the condescending
nature of indifference offered by the solipsist. Our disapproval is
cultural. As Mr. Justice Marshal realizes, revulsion is the reaction
that is to be expected from a "person of common sensibility" who
is confronted with solipsistic behavior. Ante.
It is just this type of legal embodiment of cultural preferences
that is forbidden by our Constitution. Persons of common sensi-
bility have no favored place under the Constitution, nor can they
be given special status under our laws. Yet that is precisely what
occurs when the defendant is condemned for the heartlessness and
cruelty of his act. A statute prohibiting these characteristics in and
of themselves would present a constitutional violation of the most
basic sort. I do not see why these same attitudes should be punish-
able only when the defendant is guilty of some other crime as well.
It is doubtful that such a legislative design aims at a permissible
goal. Even if it did, the means of the criminal law would still be
open to question, considering the convoluted path by which a con-
viction for cruelty is in fact obtained. There can be no doubt that
no impelling interest is served by such a governmental program,
and that a narrow constitutional analysis would defeat a statute
that embraced the principles avowed by Chief Justice Henker and
Justices Barrister and Marshal.
Moreover, contrary to the Chief Justice's assertion, it is clearly
incorrect to say that Mr. Einzig's belief is insincere. He claims to
be an atheistic solipsist. Not only does he deny the objective
existence of others, but he also rejects the notion of any Supreme
Being greater than himself. This qualification is crucial to his
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belief and to his defense. Because of his extreme subjectivism, or
subjective idealism, he believes himself to be alone in the universe,
and all manner of matter, living or not, is no-more than an exten-
sion of his own mind. In essence, then, apparently the solipsist
becomes like God, and his belief, a religion. He believes that all
things owe their existence to him.
While this most unfamiliar religion is unorthodox, heresy
trials are foreign to our Constitution. Religious experiences that
are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Any
system of law that determines penalties by reference to the ideas
in the defendant's mind is a dangerous encroachment upon both
freedom of thought and freedom of religion and serves no justi-
fiable purpose, particularly when other alternatives are available.
Generally, the criminal law is the way it is not because our best
judgment tells us that it ought to be so, but because no lawmakers
have taken pains to attempt to rationalize the law-at least not with
sufficient vigor to question basic assumptions about psychology and
criminality. Judges have plugged the cracks in the facade in a
piecemeal fashion, always striving to avoid coming to grips with
discreditable postulates of the criminal law, and always interpreting
the law to reach all cases-difficult, like the present one, as well as
simple-whether or not the legislature so intended. They have
argued that convicted defendants are dangerous, without acknowl-
edging that guilt is not determined by dangerousness, even though
punishment sometimes may be so determined. They depict spectres
of administrative burden and procedural inefficiency, as if these
considerations could overcome challenges to imprudent rules. They
foretell that rampant criminality will result from acquittals, with-
out undertaking to deduce a connection between convictions and
the deterrent effect on other persons.
Mr. Einzig has adequately demonstrated the discrimination
and prejudice upon which his conviction rests. Accordingly, he is
entitled to having his conviction and sentence set aside.
FORTHWRIGHT, J.
It is only natural that this Court has had some difficulty in
resolving the case before us. All of the traditional manipulative
contrivances of jurisprudence have proven themselves impotent to
reduce this crime to easily digestible morsels of fact. issue. rule,
application, and conclusion. In this case, we cannot eat what we
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like from the smorgasbord of discretionary devices. These tools
have been relied upon for so long that we have forgotten their
origin and purpose. In viewing the legal system through rose-
colored glasses, we have also myopically forgotten how to reason
our way through a troublesome case without the crutches of stare
decisis, rules of legislative interpretation, presumptions, and bur-
dens of proof. I pray that we be wary, lest this case of first impres-
sion become one of last impression for our criminal justice system.
There comes a time when courts must do what courts did in
ancient days, to wit: simply to rule. We must look at the law in
terms of what it does, rather than what it is. Even when the
principles upon which we usually base a determination have
eroded, there still remains the undeniable fact that a decision must
be made. That is the judicial function. One cannot utterly
succumb, as I must conclude Justice Marshal has done, and decide
that it is better not to decide. That in itself is a critical decision.
It is not our task to perfect society, but rather to order, control,
protect, and preserve it as best we can. If the conventional rules
do not stretch well enough to fit the present circumstances, it makes
more sense to admit that appraisal than to refuse to apply any rule
at all under the guise of following tradition into places where in-
evitably it should not lead. Basing a decision on the application of
"settled law," when such law cannot resolve the issues before us,
is nothing more than a refusal to rule judiciously and rationally.
The familiar standards of competence, sanity, malice, and
privilege simply do not extend to this case. Nor were they meant to
do so, and we should concede as much. Having done so, we must
seek a new rule. Some might inveigh against such a course as the
creation of a common law of crime. To yield to such criticism,
however, would be to abdicate the only essential role the judiciary
performs. The legislature cannot decide this case, for bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws are expressly forbidden. Neither
can the executive branch without a complete denial of due process
of law-except, perhaps, by way of clemency, which ultimately does
very little for the integrity of a system of rules. The controversy
has been joined. If we cannot both adjudge it and do so intelli-
gently, then ours is only a mockery of a government. When a court
refuses to decide a case such as this, it fails to resolve conflict
where conflict most needs resolution-at the perimeters of our
experience. Even a dullard can decide a case in which the law has
been established for more than a century. But, where there has not
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yet developed a body of law to deal with a situation, we must rely
on our intelligence.
Intelligent resolution of the case at bar requires an under-
standing of the relationship between the solipsist and the law. The
latter presumes the existence of numerous persons, each having
rights, privileges, powers, immunities, obligations, disabilities, and
liabilities, and the occasional occurrence of conflicts among these.
Rules arise only in the course of reconciling these conflicts between
persons. Solipsism, on the other hand, denies the possibility of
rational law by denying the possibility of reconciliation, or the need
for it. It is not possible for any rational system of law to tolerate
the anarchism of solipsism, for to do so would be to repudiate its
own very essence. I dare say that solipsism, in its pure form, is the
epitome of evil under law, for it is the extension beyond all bounds
of logic of a refusal to deal with persons qua persons, and an in-
sistence that they be perceived as mere chattels. Solipsism is selfish-
ness in its most immoderate form, going beyond even the fabled
megalomania of tyrants. Normal criminality is but a mild tendency
toward egocentricity. It would be contrary to all reason to license
criminality once it has diverged so far from decency and probity
that it is barely comprehensible. There can be no question but that
the law must restrict the practice of solipsism. The solipsist's beliefs
notwithstanding, this is the real world and we must treat it as such.
A right to be different simply does not presuppose a right to be
irrational.
The only question that remains is how to deal with this
particular solipsist. The need for sanctions against him will not
diminish so long as he maintains his present way of life, and there
is no indication that his beliefs could be modified by any method
short of brainwashing. Certainly our mere reprobation would be
meaningless. Indefinite detention is therefore unmistakably re-
quired in this case.
Were all else equal, I would vote to commit the defendant to
an asylum. But because I am not sufficiently persuaded that such an
atmosphere is markedly more conducive to recovery of the de-
fendant's senses, I will vote instead to affirm the conviction for
premeditated murder, with its penalty of life imprisonment.
Voting to affirm the judgment of conviction:
HENKER, C.J., and MARSHAL and FORTHWRIGHT, JJ.
1979)
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Voting to reverse and set aside the conviction:
BARRISTER and BLITZ, JJ.
POSTSCRIPT
Without any doubt, the Solipsist's Case does not examine all of
the claims and intricacies that inhere in the given circumstances.
The mythical facts and Justices have merely given form to various
positions concerning the nature of criminal jurisprudence and the
legal process. Above all, the opinions are intended to communicate
-as Professor Fuller was wont to do so wisely and so well-that
a viable legal system and a free society can endure and progress
only by continuing to debate fundamental principles.
